

THE FREEDOM OF THE GREEKS OF ASIA: ON THE ORIGINS OF A CONCEPT AND THE CREATION OF A SLOGAN

THE purpose of this paper is to discover the origins of a political catchphrase, 'the freedom of the Greeks of Asia'. The opening section presents and analyses first the evidence of Herodotus for the period from the Lydian conquest to the Mycale campaign, then that of Diodorus, where extant, for the same events. The contrasting usage of these two authors poses the question: when did the Greeks of Asia first come to be regularly thought of as a corporate body? That question is studied in the second section through the evidence of Thucydides and later writers for the period of the Athenian empire and that of Xenophon for the Ionian War and the campaigns of the Spartans, especially Agesilaus, in Asia Minor, and an answer is suggested: that the Greeks of Asia first came to be consistently thought of as a unit, and their freedom to be regularly exploited as a slogan, in the years between 400 and 386. The third section attempts to answer the further question which at once arises: why should this have been so?

I

The Greeks of Asia make an appearance as a corporate body on what is perhaps their first opportunity to do so, their conquest by Croesus. Herodotus speaks twice of this event.¹ On the first occasion he lists the Greek peoples overcome by the Lydians: the Ionians, the Aeolians, and the Dorians of Asia.² A little later, however, he once more mentions the Ionians and Aeolians,³ but sums up by saying that the Greeks of Asia—as opposed to the islanders—were thus reduced to tributary status.⁴

This isolated instance remains unparalleled in Herodotus. When he describes the Persian conquest of the Lydian empire, he speaks only of Ionians, or of Ionians and Aeolians. Cyrus urges the Ionians to revolt from Croesus, but they refuse.⁵ After the fall of Lydia, the Ionians and Aeolians send envoys to Sardis, but Cyrus rebuffs them because of the Ionians' rejection of his earlier overtures.⁶ The Ionians therefore resolve to ask Sparta for help. When ambassadors from the Ionians and Aeolians come to Sparta, the Spartans decide not to send a force.⁷ Nevertheless, they despatch a message to Cyrus, warning him that they will not allow him to do harm to any city of Greece.⁸

So too throughout his account of the Ionian revolt Herodotus refers to Ionians, Carians, Aeolians and Cyprians, as the case may be, but never to the Greeks of Asia.⁹ Most revealing is the story of the visit to mainland Greece in search of support by Aristagoras of Miletus. He speaks of freedom to Cleomenes, asserting that it is disgraceful for the Ionians (not the Greeks of Asia) to be slaves instead of free men, and that this reflects discredit on the Spartans as the champions of the whole of Hellas.¹⁰ Thus the notion of a struggle to achieve freedom for and by Greeks is clearly present; all that is missing is the concept of the Greeks of Asia as a corporate unity, and this despite the fact that in trying to tempt Cleomenes Aristagoras holds out the prospect of dominion over the whole of Asia. The narrative of Aristagoras' visit to Athens is briefer, but, such as it is, it strongly suggests that the notion of the Greeks of Asia as such again played no part in the Milesian's argument: Herodotus mentions only the alleged ease of conquest and the appeal to the ties of kinship between Athens and Miletus.¹¹ Similarly, when the tyrants of Cyprus encourage

In essence Seager is responsible for sections I and II (an earlier version of which was read to the Liverpool Class Assoc. in March 1977; thanks are due to Prof. F. W. Walbank for his comments on this draft) and the appendix, Tuplin for section III.

¹ Hdt. i 6.2 f., i 26.1–27.4.

² Hdt. i 6.2, cf. i 28.

³ Hdt. i 26.3.

⁴ Hdt. i 27.1: οἱ ἐν τῇ Ἀσίῃ Ἕλληνες.

⁵ Hdt. i 76.3.

⁶ Hdt. i 141.1 ff.

⁷ Hdt. i 152.1 f.

⁸ Hdt. i 152.3: γῆς τῆς Ἑλλάδος μηδεμίαν πόλιν συναμωρέειν ὡς αὐτῶν οὐ περιορισμένων.

⁹ Hdt. v 98.2, 100–6, 108–10, 112, 115–17, 119–24; vi 1.1, 6–22, 32.

¹⁰ Hdt. v 49.

¹¹ Hdt. v 97.1.

the Ionian commanders, freedom is again the objective of the struggle, but the freedom specifically of Ionia and Cyprus.¹² Finally, before the battle of Lade, the Phocaeen commander Dionysius once more presents the issue as being between freedom and slavery, but the speech is addressed to the Ionians.¹³

A similar picture emerges from Herodotus' version of the Greek advance across the Aegean in 479. Men whom he describes as messengers of the Ionians appealed to Sparta to liberate Ionia.¹⁴ Likewise the Samian appeal to the Greeks at Delos, before the battle of Mycale: Hegesistratus claims that if the Greeks only put in an appearance the Ionians will revolt from Persia. He therefore urges them to save Greeks from slavery.¹⁵ Once again then, a crusade to bring freedom to Greeks, but not to the Greeks of Asia seen as a whole. Herodotus' final comment sums up his attitude throughout: thus for the second time Ionia revolted from the Persians, while after the battle the Greeks debated what to do about Ionia and thought of evacuation to mainland Greece, because they feared that without their continuing presence the Ionians had no hope of resisting the Persians.¹⁶ In short then, although Herodotus clearly saw the Ionian revolt and the Mycale campaign as concerned with the freedom of Greeks who lived in Asia, in this connection at least he simply does not seem to have had the concept of the Greeks of Asia as a unit.

Diodorus is a very different matter. Nothing remains of his treatment of the Lydian conquest, but even in its fragmentary surviving form his account of the dealings of the Greeks with Cyrus is from our standpoint very striking. For him it is the Greeks of Asia, not the Ionians and Aeolians, who seek Cyrus' friendship after the fall of Lydia,¹⁷ and when the Spartans learn that the Greeks of Asia are in danger they send to Cyrus, forbidding him, in their capacity of kinsmen to the Greeks of Asia, to enslave the Greek cities.¹⁸ Diodorus' account of the Ionian revolt is unfortunately also lost, but certain of his remarks on the Persian wars are worthy of note. When Xerxes invaded Greece, he claims, men expected that, as the Greek cities of Asia had already been enslaved, so those of Greece proper would experience a similar fate.¹⁹ In 479 the Samian envoys who come to Delos ask the Greeks specifically to liberate the Greeks of Asia.²⁰ The slogan is taken up by Leotychidas, who announces before the battle of Mycale, in order to encourage desertion from the Persian fleet, that the Greeks have come to free the Greek cities of Asia.²¹ In the course of the battle Aeolians joined in, and many others of those who lived in Asia, for, says Diodorus, a wonderful desire for liberty had come over the cities of Asia.²² Later, in describing the calculations of Themistocles, Diodorus presents him as reckoning that Athens will have the Ionians on her side, so that through their help she will be able to liberate the remainder of the Greeks of Asia.²³

By the time of Diodorus then 'the Greeks of Asia' is an established label for a group of peoples and cities conceived of as a single community, and 'the freedom of the Greeks of Asia' is a well-worn slogan to be brought into play wherever it might be appropriate. Out of the contrast between Herodotus and Diodorus spring the questions that this paper tries to answer: when and why did the Greeks of Asia first come to be regularly thought of as a single unit, and when did the freedom of the Greeks of Asia become a political and diplomatic catchword? The fact that Herodotus and Diodorus are describing the same events serves as a cogent reminder that the appearance of the concept and the slogan in our sources does not necessarily prove that they existed at the time of the events to which those sources apply them.

II

When we turn from the Persian wars to the history of the Athenian empire, Thucydides offers little that is to the point. What there is, however, suggests that for him, as in the main for

¹² Hdt. v 109.2, cf. 116.

¹³ Hdt. vi 11.2.

¹⁴ Hdt. viii 132.1.

¹⁵ Hdt. ix 90.2.

¹⁶ Hdt. ix 104, 106.2.

¹⁷ Diod. ix 35.1: τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν Ἑλλήνων.

¹⁸ Diod. ix 36.1.

¹⁹ Diod. xii 1.2.

²⁰ Diod. xi 34.2: ἐλευθερώσαι τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν Ἑλλήνας.

²¹ Diod. xi 34.4.

²² Diod. xi 36.5. One may contrast xi 37.1 f. (Ionians and Aeolians), 3 (Ionians) in the evacuation debate; here, however, kinship with Athens is specifically relevant, as also at xi 41.4.

²³ Diod. xi 41.4.

Herodotus, the Greeks of Asia did not form a single unit. In describing the complaints brought against Pausanias, he says that they were made by 'the other Greeks', not least by the Ionians and those who had recently been liberated from the King.²⁴ The Mytilenaeans at Sparta defend their adherence to Athens as intended not to enslave the Greeks to Athens but to free the Greeks—not the Greeks of Asia—from Persia.²⁵ This theme is taken up by Hermocrates at Camarina. He claims that Athens made herself leader of the Ionians on the pretext of taking revenge on Persia, then set about subjecting them. Athens did not fight Persia for the freedom of the Greeks, nor were the Greeks fighting for their own freedom: Athens was fighting to enslave them to herself, the Greeks merely for a change of masters.²⁶ He contrasts free Dorians with Ionians, Hellespontines and islanders, who are accustomed to be the slaves of the Persians or of some other master.²⁷ So, like Herodotus on all but one occasion, the Hermocrates of Thucydides says nothing of the Greeks of Asia but is either more general, speaking simply of the Greeks, or more specific, naming Ionians and Hellespontines, as the context demands. In his reply Euphemus too speaks of the Ionians and islanders, and refuses to claim that Athens fought for their freedom more than for that of the whole of Greece and her own.²⁸

The fifth-century evidence then, such as it is, suggests that, though there was discussion of the freedom of the Greeks in the context of attacks on and defences of the foundation of the Delian League and the growth of the Athenian empire, the Greeks of Asia did not play a part in it, nor was their freedom exploited as a slogan.²⁹ With this in mind we may turn to the 'Peace of Callias'. As is notorious, no fifth-century source mentions the peace at all. But certain later allusions to it are relevant. The earliest of these comes in the speech of Lycurgus against Leocrates, where it is said that the Athenians imposed boundaries on the Persians that secured the freedom of Greece and made a treaty that guaranteed autonomy for the Greeks, not only those of Europe, but also those who lived in Asia.³⁰ Although the contrast is not drawn directly in this passage, it is clear that this description of the terms of the 'Peace of Callias' is coloured by the antithesis between its provisions and those of the Peace of Antalcidas, which had become a commonplace of Athenian oratory in the fourth century. The other relevant source is also later than the King's Peace, namely Diodorus, who reports a clause of the peace that all the Greek cities of Asia are to be autonomous.³¹ Later he states the contrast explicitly: under the 'Peace of Callias' the Greek cities of Asia were to be autonomous, under the Peace of Antalcidas they were to be subject to Persia.³²

These passages may seem to provide a clue. It would appear inherently plausible that the Greeks of Asia first came to be looked on as a unit and their freedom to be a subject of debate at the time of the King's Peace, which deprived them, as a unit, of that freedom. It remains to be seen whether or not the clue is a red herring. The trail leads first to the Ionian War and the various negotiations between Sparta and Persia. Nothing to the purpose occurs in the terms of either the first or the second treaty.³³ The criticism of these agreements by Lichas makes no mention of the Greeks of Asia, singling out for individual attention all the islands, Thessaly, Locris and all lands as far as Boeotia and summarising the effects of the treaties as the placing of the Greeks under Persian rule instead of the achievement of their freedom.³⁴ The third treaty contains the notorious clause that the King's land, such of it as is in Asia, is to belong to the King.³⁵ That this provision might affect the fate of the Greeks of Asia is clear: the King would no doubt consider that they constituted a part of his land, though the ambiguity of the wording might allow the Spartans at some future date to deny that they had intended the Greeks of Asia to be included in the concession. But once again the Greeks of Asia make no overt appearance. Lichas at least was later

²⁴ Thuc. i 95.1.

²⁵ Thuc. iii 10.3.

²⁶ Thuc. vi 76.3 f.

²⁷ Thuc. vi 77.1, 80.3.

²⁸ Thuc. vi 82.3, 83.2.

²⁹ Even Diodorus is relatively barren on these matters. In xi 60.1 and 4 he employs greater precision than usual in speaking of those cities liberated by persuasion or force by Cimon; cf. xii 42.5 on the allies of Athens at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.

³⁰ Lyc. 73: μή μόνον τοὺς τὴν Εὐρώπην ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς τὴν Ἀσίαν κατοικοῦντας.

³¹ Diod. xii 4.5; cf. xii 2.1: the Athenians forced the Persians to liberate all the cities of Asia by treaty. This is entirely consistent with Diodorus' view of Cimon's last expedition to Cyprus as a renewal of the war against the Persians on behalf of the Greeks of Asia (xii 3.1).

³² Diod. xii 26.2

³³ Thuc. viii 18, 37.

³⁴ Thuc. viii 43.3, cf. 52. On the possible exaggeration, and Persian interpretations cf. D. M. Lewis, *Sparta and Persia* (Leiden 1977) 90, 99 with n. 69.

³⁵ Thuc. viii 58.2.

to clarify his position, saying that for the duration of the war it was expedient that the Milesians and the others in the King's territory should remain enslaved.³⁶ Here the phrase 'the Greeks of Asia' might well have been used to designate those whose freedom was to be thus temporarily sacrificed, but it is not, and in summary it may be said that, although the freedom of the Greeks of Asia was an important consideration in Sparta's dealings with Persia in the Ionian War, neither the slogan nor the concept it presupposes appears in Thucydides' account.

However, when Thucydides gives way to Xenophon the position changes. In 400 Tissaphernes demanded the submission of all the Ionian cities. Their desire for freedom and fear of the satrap prompted them to appeal to Sparta, as the champion of all Hellas, to take up the cause of themselves, the Greeks of Asia, protect their land from devastation and secure their freedom.³⁷ This first recurrence of the concept is all the more striking in that in general terms the appeal so markedly recalls that of Aristagoras at the time of the Ionian revolt, when the slogan did not appear.

On his arrival in Asia Minor in 399 Dercylidas made a more limited appeal, urging the cities of Aeolis to free themselves and laying down freedom and autonomy as the conditions of Spartan friendship for Midias the tyrant of Scepsis.³⁸ When he returns in 397 Xenophon's report shows an interesting development. Envoys from the Ionian cities came to Sparta claiming that Tissaphernes could, if he wished, leave the Greek cities autonomous.³⁹ The reference is clearly to the Greek cities of Asia, and it appears in consequence that, by the time Xenophon was writing at least, the concept of the Greeks or the Greek cities of Asia was so well established that it could be referred to as it were in shorthand. The same abbreviation occurs in the account of Dercylidas' negotiations with Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus: Dercylidas' one condition was that the King should leave the Greek cities their autonomy.⁴⁰

But it is with the expedition of Agesilaus to Asia Minor that the theme really comes into its own. At Ephesus in 396 Agesilaus demanded of Tissaphernes that the cities of Asia should be autonomous, like those of the Greek homeland.⁴¹ The language of Xenophon in the *Hellenica* and *Agesilaus* is confirmed by Plutarch and Polyaeus.⁴² The cities of Asia appear again in Tithraustes' offer to Agesilaus in the following year to leave them autonomous provided they paid the ancient tribute to the King.⁴³ When the outbreak of the Corinthian War forced Agesilaus to abandon his schemes in Asia Minor and return to Greece, the Greeks of Asia are said to have been bitterly disappointed.⁴⁴ Later, in a schematic rhetorical contrast between Agesilaus and Antalcidas, it could be said that the Spartans sent Antalcidas to surrender to the King the Greeks of Asia, for whom Agesilaus had fought.⁴⁵ Even at the end of his life Agesilaus still yearned, according to Xenophon, once more to liberate the Greeks of Asia.⁴⁶

However, the freedom of the Greeks of Asia seems to have played no part in the conflicting judgments that were passed at the time and later on the significance of Conon's victory at Cnidus.

³⁶ Thuc. viii 84.5. Lewis (n. 34) 110 ff., argues that Sparta's abandonment of the Asiatic Greeks after 411 was not total and that their autonomy may even have been secured in a treaty concluded by Boeotius in 407. This is possible but not compelling. (i) That Sparta was in a mood to ignore the agreements she had made is perhaps sufficient to explain the treatment of Persian garrisons at Antandrus and Cnidus (if Sparta was involved). (ii) As Lewis himself admits, it is possible that the Ionians would have been prepared to fight despite the treaties of 411: to get rid of the Athenians might seem the first priority, and Lichas had more or less promised that their cession to Persia would not be permanent. (iii) It is true that the negotiations of 397–5 do not suggest either that Sparta has changed her ground or that Persia feels cheated. But the rising of Cyrus and Sparta's support of it had produced such a different situation that it might have seemed pointless for either side to appeal to arrangements of the preceding decade. (iv) That the treaty of Boeotius deserves a place in history is true, and Lewis deserves gratitude for demonstrating its existence. But that it included a territorial clause is conjecture, and need not follow from the

presence of such a clause in its predecessors.

³⁷ Xen. *Hell.* iii 1.3: ἐπεὶ πάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος προστάται εἰσὶν, ἐπιμεληθῆναι καὶ σφῶν τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ Ἑλλήνων, ὅπως ἢ τε χώρα μὴ ῥηοῖτο αὐτῶν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐλεύθεροι εἶεν. So too in Diod. xiv 35.6 the appeal comes from the Greek cities of Asia. Apart from references to his own time, Xenophon also speaks of the Ionians, Aeolians and almost all the Greeks of Asia being forced to follow Croesus against Cyrus (*Cyrop.* vi 2.10).

³⁸ Xen. *Hell.* iii 1.16, 20.

³⁹ Xen. *Hell.* iii 2.12.

⁴⁰ Xen. *Hell.* iii 2.20.

⁴¹ Xen. *Hell.* iii 4.5: αὐτονόμους καὶ τὰς ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ πόλεις εἶναι, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰς ἐν τῇ παρ' ἡμῖν Ἑλλάδι, Ages. 1.10.

⁴² Plut. *Ages.* 9.1, Polyaeus. ii 1.8.

⁴³ Xen. *Hell.* iii 4.25.

⁴⁴ Xen. *Ages.* 1.38. Some appear in his army at Coronea (*Hell.* iv 3.15).

⁴⁵ Plut. *Ages.* 23.1.

⁴⁶ Xen. *Ages.* 2.29.

Isocrates and Dinarchus could claim that Cnidus brought freedom to the Greeks, but it is clear that freedom from Sparta is meant and the Greeks of Asia get no special mention.⁴⁷ The inscription on the base of Conon's own statue at Athens made a slightly less grandiose claim, that he had freed the allies of Athens.⁴⁸ Nor did the hostile view of the battle, expressed by Lysias in the *Epitaphios* and Isocrates in the *Panegyricus* and put by Xenophon into the mouth of Dercylidas at Abydos, allude to the Greeks of Asia: it is the freedom of Greece as a whole which Lysias bewails as lost and which Dercylidas declares can still be saved.⁴⁹

The theme next appears at the time of Antalcidas' first, abortive mission to Persia. His offer to Tiribazus was that Sparta would surrender to the King the Greek cities in Asia.⁵⁰ In Xenophon's account the Athenian rejection of the terms at Sardis is not grounded in concern for the Greeks of Asia, but originates solely in the fear that the autonomy clause would be used to deprive Athens of Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros.⁵¹ Nor did Andocides on his return from the conference at Sparta make any allusion to the freedom of the Greeks of Asia. Yet it is likely that those at Athens who repudiated the peace made appeal to the slogan, as is suggested by the garbled notice of Philochorus that the Athenians rejected the Peace of Antalcidas because it was written therein that the Greeks of Asia were all to be assigned to the King.⁵² Nevertheless, the surrender of the Greek cities of Asia passed into the royal rescript for the King's Peace,⁵³ and so into the treaty, to be repeatedly pilloried by Athenian orators both in isolation and in schematised contrast with the alleged terms of the 'Peace of Callias'.⁵⁴ The fate imposed upon them by the peace established the notion of the Greeks of Asia as a single community firmly once and for all, and though it is striking, it is perhaps not surprising that the freedom of the Greeks of Asia acquired its full force and poignancy as a slogan only when that freedom seemed to have been irrevocably lost.

The clue which suggested that the freedom of the Greeks of Asia might first appear as a slogan in 386 thus seems to have been not quite a red herring but an over-simplification, simultaneously too general and too precise. It would of course be possible to argue that Xenophon's language in writing of the 390s reflects the usage of the period after 386, but the Greeks of Asia as a unit of thought and the freedom of the Greeks of Asia as a diplomatic slogan are both so apt to the situation that pertained in Asia Minor in the years after 400 as to justify the conjecture that it was during these years that men first came habitually to think and speak of the Greeks of Asia as a single community and to exploit the theme of their freedom for their own political ends.

Before we turn to the question of why this should have been so, certain characteristic features of the situations in which the notion occurs deserve attention. First, except in the case of their isolated appearance in Herodotus, where they are set against the islanders, if the Greeks of Asia are compared or contrasted with another body of people, it is always with the Greeks of the homeland. Indeed the concept of the freedom of the Greeks of Asia might be said to arise out of that of the freedom of Greece proper, which as it were sets the standard. It is precisely because the Spartans had claimed in the Peloponnesian War to be liberating Greece from Athens that the Greeks of Asia could claim in 400 that in the interests of consistency with her chosen stance she should go on to free them from Persia.⁵⁵ Secondly, it is striking that the Greeks of Asia, even when they can justly be spoken of as a unit, initiate almost no positive action. They are almost always passive, the actual or potential victims of enslavement or recipients of freedom, imposed

⁴⁷ Isoc. v 63, ix 56, 68, Din. i 14, iii 17. For more detailed analysis of reactions to Cnidus, cf. *JHS* lxxxvii (1967) 99 ff.

⁴⁸ Dem. xx 69.

⁴⁹ Lys. ii 59 f., Isoc. iv 119, Xen. *Hell.* iv 8.4 f.

⁵⁰ Xen. *Hell.* iv 8.14. The cities in Asia are mentioned later at the time of Thrasybulus' expedition (*Hell.* iv 8.27).

⁵¹ Xen. *Hell.* iv 8.15. On these matters, cf. *JHS* lxxxvii (1967) 104 f.

⁵² *FGrH* 328 F 149, cf. Diod. xiv 110.4.

⁵³ Xen. *Hell.* v 1.31: τὰς μὲν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ πόλεις ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι, cf. Diod. xiv 110.3.

⁵⁴ Dem. xxiii 140, Isoc. xii 103, 106, cf. 59, *Ep.* ix 8; cf. Diod. xii 26.2. For Spartan betrayal of the Greeks of Asia in the peace, cf. Diod. xv 9.5, 19.4 (where the Greeks of Asia are contrasted with the cities of Greece proper). Cf.

also Tiribazus' defence of his own achievement (Diod. xv 10.2).

⁵⁵ Especially clear in the Ionian appeal of 400 (Xen. *Hell.* iii 1.3) and Agesilaus' terms to Tissaphernes in 396 (Xen. *Hell.* iii 4.5). Later, cf. Lyc. 73, Diod. xii 1.2, xv 19.4. The notion is implicit in Herodotus: both the Spartan message to Cyrus (i 152.3) and Aristagoras' appeal (v 49) are based on Sparta's position as champion of all Greece, which is a consequence of her standing in mainland Greece proper. For Spartan liberation propaganda in the Peloponnesian War, cf. Thuc. i 69.1, 122.3 (recommended pre-war by Corinth); ii 8.4 (outbreak); ii 72.1, iii 59.4, 63.3 (Plataea); iii 13.1, 32.2 (Mytilene); iv 85.1, 5 f., 86.1, 87.3 ff., 108.2, 114.3, 120.3, 121.1, v 9.9 (Brasidas); viii 46.3, cf. 52 (exploited by Alcibiades); Xen. *Hell.* ii 2.23 (end of the war).

or granted by external agents. The virtual limit of their active contribution is to appeal on occasion for help. Finally, it should be remembered that a slogan is no sure guide to policy. What the freedom of the Greeks of Asia meant to Agesilaus is uncertain. He seems to have wanted to establish a buffer-zone of rebel satraps and tribes between the Persian empire and the Greek cities of the coast,⁵⁶ but whether, if this plan had been successful, he would have left the Greeks to enjoy their freedom or attempted to coerce them into a new Spartan empire is beyond conjecture. But what the freedom of the Greeks of Asia meant to Thrasybulus is painfully clear.⁵⁷ So from the first the slogan, like others as high-sounding, may have been no more than a cloak for naked, not to say rampant, self-interest.

III

Granted the proposition that the concept 'Greeks of Asia' first came into use at the turn of the fifth/fourth centuries, one naturally poses the question, why not earlier?

'The Greeks living in Asia' or 'the Greeks in Asia' were not intrinsically natural formulae. With varying definitions of Asia, 'the Greeks in Asia' could in principle include people from Trapezus⁵⁸ to Side—or even Naucratis⁵⁹ or Cyrene.⁶⁰ On the latter (admittedly extreme) views, the area involved is huge and totally diverse. But even if one limited the extent to Asia Minor, though the area is smaller, the diversity is not much less. Why should anyone normally think of the Greeks within it as a unit?

An ethnographer might have done so, had all the Greeks of the Asiatic diaspora shared some interesting characteristics distinguishing them from those of Europe. But that was hardly so.⁶¹ The Greeks in Asia formed a class whose only common characteristic was that its members were in Asia, and that was not in itself enough to make 'the Greeks of Asia' a part of common parlance. It will be convenient to look at the matter further from the point of view of various interested parties.

First, the Greeks in Asia themselves. The western coastline of Asia Minor contained Ionians, Dorians⁶² and Aeolians, and there is no cause to doubt that Dorians felt distinct from the Ionians and Aeolians (from whom they were geographically separate)⁶³ or to suppose that Aeolians and Ionians had more in common than Dorians and Ionians (despite e.g. common use of the oracle at Branchidae⁶⁴ and a common line after the fall of Sardis and in the Ionian Revolt).⁶⁵ Ionia was an area of once great prosperity in which the city-state way of life had taken full hold; not so mainland Aeolis, characterized by the interdependent features of small-scale settlement, parochial economics⁶⁶ and under-developed political life.⁶⁷ The general situation is, of course, complicated

⁵⁶ Cf. *LCM* ii (1977) 183 f.

⁵⁷ Cf. *JHS* lxxxvii (1967) 105 ff.; G. L. Cawkwell, *CQ* lxx (1976) 270 ff.

⁵⁸ Or even Phanagoria, on the east side of L. Maeotis, regarded by some as a boundary of Europe and Asia (Hippocr. *Airs, Waters, Places* 13).

⁵⁹ *Contra* Hdt. ii 15 f.; iv 36 f.

⁶⁰ Cf. Hippocr. *Airs, Waters, Places* 12.

⁶¹ *Ibid.* 12 f. (a comparison of the relation between climate and physiognomy/character in Asia and Europe) does not fit the bill, since *ὁκόσοι γὰρ ἐν τῇ Ἀσίῃ Ἕλληνας ἢ βάρβαροι μὴ δεσπόζονται, ἀλλ' αὐτόνομοί εἰσι καὶ ἐνωτοῖσι ταλαιπωρεῦσιν, οὗτοι μαχμμάτατοί εἰσι πάντων* does not confer the title 'Greeks of Asia' on anyone. If one thought of Asiatic Greeks as soft, this was because of Ionian history (cf. Hdt. i 143) and likely to be expressed in those terms.

⁶² Many of the western Dorians were not mainlanders, of course. See below.

⁶³ Cf. M. Cary, *The Geographic Background of Greek and Roman History* (Oxford 1949) 162–3. The apparent non-

participation of the Dorians in the 'Ionian Revolt' is notable in this context.

⁶⁴ Hdt. i 157.

⁶⁵ The joint participation of Ionians, Dorians and Aeolians in the Naucratis Hellenion (Hdt. ii 178.2) naturally demonstrates nothing about relations within Asia Minor.

⁶⁶ E.g. the only Aeolians involved in Naucratis (cf. n. 65) were Lesbian.

⁶⁷ Only Cyme was at all considerable (and Ephoros' attempts to make it seem more so were found laughable, *FGrH* 70 F 236). Descendants of the philo-Persians of the 480s still ruled communities in the Caicus valley in the 390s (Xen. *Hell.* iii 1.6). On Troadic Aeolis, see J. M. Cook, *The Troad: An Archaeological and Topographical Study* (Oxford 1973) 363. Herodotus' brief comment (i 149.2, cf. 142.1) that Cymeian Aeolis had better land but worse climate than Ionia may have some pertinence to the different development of the areas. The contrast drawn between Ionia and Aeolis may to some extent apply between Ionia and Doris as well (cf. J. M. Cook, *The Greeks in Ionia and the East* [London 1962] 30).

by the fact that 'Ionian' was liable to be used of people outside the Dodekapolis,⁶⁸ a tendency to some extent inhibiting the emergence of the 'Greeks of Asia'; but this was only a tribute to the preponderant importance of those cities and would (if anything) tend to enhance Ionian feelings of superiority.

Some further points may be made. (i) The three ethnic divisions were not themselves indivisible. In each case there are several sub-groups, some of them geographically separate one from another⁶⁹ (Ionians: the highly exclusive Dodekapolis,⁷⁰ Smyrna,⁷¹ the Milesian/Phocaeon colonies of the Sea of Marmara; Dorians: the Pentapolis,⁷² Halicarnassus,⁷³ other communities in SW Asia Minor that had never been part of the Pentapolis,⁷⁴ Hellespontine cities such as Astacus, Chalcedon; Aeolians: those 'next to Ionia' around Cyme⁷⁵ and those of the Troad, later mainland settlers deriving from Lesbos and Tenedos⁷⁶)—sub-groups having little intrinsic reason for community of sentiment. (ii) The existence of the religious 'leagues' in the Ionian and Dorian cases provided (as archaic and classical history shows) no guarantee of common interests or check on inter-city squabbles.⁷⁷ In any case, both leagues over-ran the boundaries of Asia. Samos and Chios were not in Asia, and of the Dorian Pentapolis only Cnidus was on the mainland. Thus the sense of unity of e.g. the Ionian cities, even if it mitigated at all the usual city-state fragmentation,⁷⁸ worked against the creation of a unified concept of the Greeks of Asia by blurring the vital Asia/Europe distinction. (iii) Viewed from e.g. Miletus, the Greeks of the Troad were no closer neighbours than those of central Greece, and whereas the former were ethnically and socially distinct, Athens was the metropolitan city. Since a Milesian travelling to e.g. Abydus would go by sea, just as he would in going to Athens, the fact that Abydus was in the same land mass need not have weighed very heavily.⁷⁹ A grouping of the Ionians with the islanders of the Aegean⁸⁰ was as natural as one with the other inhabitants of Asia Minor. (iv) Just as the large off-shore islands could be regarded as part of the Greek world of 'Asia', thus blurring the Asia/Europe distinction, so there were problems about the Hellespontine region. To a Milesian interested in passage to the Black Sea, the Dardanelles and Sea of Marmara represented more a line of communication North–South than one of demarcation East–West.⁸¹ Hence the Hellespontine region came to be seen as a unit in its own right,⁸² a unit that cut across the Asia/Europe

⁶⁸ See Hdt. v 37.2; ix 106.2; Thuc. viii 86.4. And contrast Hdt. iv 138 with iv 89, 97, 128, 133, 134, 136; iv 98 ('Ionian' tyrants) with iv 97 (Aristagoras of Cyme), 138 (Coes of Mytilene); i 6, 28 with i 92; ii 152–4 with iii 4 (and ML no. 7).

⁶⁹ The cases of the Ionians and Dorians are obvious. The two groups of Aeolians were quite separated by Mysians, north of the Caicus valley: cf. J. M. Cook, *Greeks in Ionia* 27, D. M. Lewis (n. 34) 56.

⁷⁰ See Hdt. i 142 ff. Even within this group notice (i) the existence of four dialect groups (Hdt. i 142.4) two of which at least had, acc. Hdt., nothing in common; (ii) the way that Ephesus looked to the hinterland rather than the sea and was heavily orientalised: cf. Cary (n. 63) 163; R. Meiggs, *Athenian Empire* (Oxford 1972) 51; Lewis (n. 34) 116; L. H. Jeffery, *Archaic Greece: The City-States c. 700–500 B.C.* (London 1976) 222; (iii) the non-participation of Ephesus and Colophon in the Apatouria, the festival regarded by Hdt. as the true distinctive feature of the Ionians (i 147.2).

⁷¹ Originally Aeolic, but captured by Colophonians, though never admitted to the Panionion league: Hdt. i 150; Mimm. 12D=9W; Paus. v 8.7, iv 21.4. On Strab. 6330 see C. Roebuck, *CPh* 1 (1955) 38 n. 37.

⁷² I.e. Cnidus, Cos, Lindos, Cameirus, Ialysus, all sharing the cult of Apollo at Triopion: Hdt. i 144; D.H. *AR* iv 25; Ps.-Scylax 99; Schol. Theoc. xvii 68/9. On the site see G. E. Bean, J. M. Cook *BSA* xlvii (1952) 208 f.

⁷³ Originally part of the Triopion league, but later excluded perhaps not just for the reason Hdt. gives (i 144.2–3) but because the city remained very Carian (and the Greeks there spoke Ionic); see Jeffery (n. 70) 195,

Cook, *Greeks in Ionia* 30.

⁷⁴ Cf. Hdt. i 144.1 for ref. to them. A glance at a map will show that there were plenty of communities both in the Dorian area and the Ionian one, which were outside the religious leagues and cannot all have been mere subject possessions of league cities. There are also odd cases such as Iasos (alleged Argive foundation, but in fact Ionic in character, *RE* ix (1914) 788) or Magnesia-ad-Maeandrum (Aeolic acc. Strabo 647c, and certainly non-Ionic, despite its position).

⁷⁵ Hdt. i 149.1 lists eleven such communities.

⁷⁶ Cf. Cook, *Troad* 360–3. The two areas are clearly distinguished in e.g. Hdt. i 151; v 122–3 and (vis-à-vis the Persian satrapies) Xen. *Hell.* iii 1.6, 10. They fall into different panels in the Athenian Tribute Lists.

⁷⁷ Cf. merely *exempli causa*, Jeffery (n. 70) 209, 212, 221, 222, 223, 225, 232.

⁷⁸ I am unconvinced that there was any *intrinsically* and *regularly* political character to the Panionion league (compare Roebuck [n. 71] 26 ff., esp. 31—though a more extreme position could be argued), so any special unity there may have been would have been at the level of the élitist self-congratulation attacked by Hdt. (i 146.1–147.2).

⁷⁹ Jeffery, (n. 70) 207, notes that one can sail from Samos to Athens without ever losing sight of land.

⁸⁰ Cf. Hdt. iii 124, iv 35; Thuc. i 12, vi 77, vii 5, viii 56, 96. In the archaic period this was expressed by the Delian panegyris (Thuc. iii 104).

⁸¹ Hence the Sea of Marmara was the *Propontis*.

⁸² Cf. e.g. Hdt. iv 95; Xen. *Hell.* iii 4.11, iv 3.17; and p. 150 below.

distinction at its most telling point, where one can cross from one to the other in the shortest time. The world of the Dardanelles, Sea of Marmara and Bosphoros is quite different again from that of Ionia, (Cyme) Aeolis or the Dorian Pentapolis, and so long as the unitary view of it held sway (as it did for most Greeks) the concept 'Greeks of Asia' was not likely to gain much currency. Conversely, when decisive influence in the area fell to Greeks who lacked the usual maritime perspective (as it started to do from 412), things were liable to be different. (v) The tag '... in Asia' tended to be used where there was some element of the unexpected involved—Thracians in Asia, Ethiopians in Asia, Magnesians in Asia, Ἀμύντης ὁ ἐν τῇ Ἀσίῃ⁸³ are people in an area to which they did not (in Greek views) 'properly' belong. But no Greek (least of all one living in Asia) was going to think that there was anything eccentric about the existence of Greek cities in Asia.⁸⁴

Secondly, the Persian view. This differed in certain ways from that of most Greeks. (a) The Persians were prepared to think of the Greeks as a single ethnic type. The official documents of the Achaemenid empire reveal only one proper name for them, viz *Yaunā* (i.e. Ionians),⁸⁵ a name reflecting (of course) the Ionocentric nomenclature of the Greeks themselves. There was no interest in further distinguishing Dorians or Aeolians.⁸⁶ Of course, some distinctions were drawn within the class of *Yaunā*. Besides 'Ionia' and 'Ionians' we find *Yaunā tyaiy uškahyā* (Ionians on the dry land),⁸⁷ *Yaunā tya drayahiyā dārayatiy* or *tyaiy drayahyā* (Ionians [dwelling] on/by the sea),⁸⁸ *Yaunā tyaiy paradraya (dārayatiy)* or *dahyāva tyā paradraya* (Ionians beyond the sea, lands beyond the sea),⁸⁹ *Yaunā takabarā* (petasos-wearing Ionians).⁹⁰ The identification of these various groups is a difficult matter. One possibility is that the Persians could discern two separate groups of Greeks in Asia ('those on the dry land' and 'those on/by the sea') corresponding roughly to Ionia/Aeolis/Doris and Troad/Hellespont.⁹¹ If so, however, they did not invariably think in this way, since (on this hypothesis) the texts (cf. n. 87) D B, D Na, D Sm, D Saa and A? P apparently recognise only *Yaunā* for the whole of Greek Asia⁹² and both D Se and X Ph mention only 'Ionians on/by the sea' and 'Ionians across the sea', leaving the former phrase to cover everyone East of the Sea of Marmara/Dardanelles. If one changed the initial hypothesis and took 'Ionians on/by the sea' to be the Greeks of Cilicia and Cyprus,⁹³ then D Pe recognizes two groups within Asia, D B, D Na, D Sm, D Saa and A? P still recognise only one, and D Se and X Ph ignore Ionia altogether, presumably subsuming it under Sardis. This is not an impossible conclusion—judging

⁸³ Hdt. iii 90, vii 75 (Thracians); iii 94, vii 69 (Ethiopians); iii 90 (Magnesians); viii 136 (Amyntas).

⁸⁴ We find 'Dorians in Asia' (Hdt. i 6, vii 93; Plut. *Per.* 17), but not, I think, 'Ionians in Asia', 'Aeolians in Asia'. The distinction perhaps arises because mainland Ionians and Aeolians did not commonly describe themselves as such (cf. Hdt. i 143 on Athens), whereas the Spartans e.g. did use the title 'Dorian'.

⁸⁵ This applies both to the lists of peoples in the empire discussed below, on whose character see Cameron, *JNES* xxxii (1973) 47 f., and to refs to smaller groups of Greeks working in Susa and Persepolis. Cf. R. G. Kent, *Old Persian: Grammar, Texts, Lexicon*² (New Haven 1953) D Sf 33–4, 42 f., 48–9 (Elamite version in W. Hinz, *JNES* ix [1950] 1 f.); F. Vallat, *Rev. d'Assyriologie* lxxiv (1970) D Sz 30, 45; R. T. Hallock, *Persepolis Fortification Tablets* (Chicago 1969) (hereafter=PF) 1224.8 f.; 2072.84 f.; G. Cameron, *Persepolis Treasury Tablets* (Chicago 1948) (hereafter=PTT) 15.6. On these Greek workers see also e.g. Goossens, *Nouvelle Clío* i (1949) 32 f.; J. Guepin, *Persica* i (1963/4) 34 f.; G. Pugliese-Caratelli, *East & West* xvi (1966) 31 f. (cf. PF 1.71); C. Nylander, *Ionians at Pasargadae* (Uppsala 1970) *passim*. *Yauna* even appears as a personal name; PTT 21.21; PF 1798.19; 1799.17; 1800.20; 1808.14; 1810.17; 1942.27; 1965.29 (Lewis [n. 34] 12 suggests that more than one individual is involved). People who resorted to naming individuals *Yauna* were unlikely to be any more concerned about precise ethnic status than were the Greeks who called slaves Skythes or Kar.

⁸⁶ I take passages such as Hdt. iii 90 f.; vii 9a; vii 93 to be

'hellenizations'.

⁸⁷ Ionia/Ionians: D B I15 Na 28; D Sm 8; D Saa 18 f. in F. Vallat, *Syria* xlvi (1971) 58; A? P 23. Ionians on the dry land: D Pe 13. Refs to old Persian Documents are taken, unless otherwise indicated, from Kent (n. 85).

⁸⁸ X Ph 23 (Elamite version in G. Cameron, *Welt des Orients* ii [1954–9] 470 f.); D Pe 14; D Se 27.

⁸⁹ D Se 28; X Ph 24; D Pe 14.

⁹⁰ D Na 29; D Sm 10–11; A? P 26.

⁹¹ Thus A. T. Olmstead, *CPh* xxxiv (1939) 307; R. G. Kent, *JNES* ii (1943) 304 n. 12; A. R. Burn, *Persia and the Greeks* (London 1962) 109; R. Schmitt, *Historia* xxi (1972) 522 f.; Lewis (n. 34) 51; 83 n. 10. Cf. also Hdt. iii 90 f.; Aesch. *Pers.* 865 f.

⁹² Cf. the hieroglyphic Canal inscriptions (in G. Posener, *La Première Domination Perse en Egypte* [Cairo 1936] nos 8–10, with pp. 181–8) which leave only one cartouche for Ionia: cf. Cameron, *JNES* ii (1943) 308. Even if the cartouche included two Ionias (as that for Scythia perhaps included two Scythias of arguable identity—cf. Posener, 54, 184 f.; Cameron (n. 85) 55 n. 48) such a layout would correspond to a view that Ionia was really a single unit. (I am assuming that the 'Peoples by the Sea' and 'Lands of the Sea' in D B and D Saa are not equivalent to the 'Ionians on the Sea').

⁹³ Junge, *Klio* xxxiv (1941) 9 n. 4, 40 n. 6; G. Walser, *Die Völkerschaften auf den Reliefs von Persepolis* (Berlin 1966) 29, 47; E. Herzfeld, *The Persian Empire* (Wiesbaden 1968) 92, 293, 309; other authors quoted in Schmitt (n. 91) 523–4, nn. 9–17.

by the gold tablets of Hamadan and Persepolis and a recently published hieroglyphic inscription from Susa⁹⁴—and the same result would emerge from a third initial hypothesis, that ‘Ionians on/by the sea’ refers to the Greek (Aegean) islanders;⁹⁵ for though that would make D B, D Pe, D Na, D Sm, D Saa and A? P put all named group, it would still leave D Se and X Ph apparently ignoring them.

One may doubt whether a satisfactory solution can be found for these nomenclature problems, but both the universal use of the single name *Yaunā* and the fact that on any hypothesis the majority of texts have only one phrase for all of Greek Asia are signs that the Persians were more amenable than the Greeks to a unitary notion of the Greeks of Asia.

(b) Another feature of the Persian way of looking at the world would make them more likely than the Greeks to keep ‘Asia’ and its inhabitants separate from racially similar people in the Balkans, Thrace and the Aegean islands. The phrases discussed above exemplify the use of the sea-coast as a means of defining groups of people within the Empire. The same thing appears in the treatment of Scythia in imperial documents, where we find ‘Scythians across the sea’.⁹⁶ Now it is true that, both with Greeks and Scythians, we also find defining phrases of a ‘cultural’ character, viz: ‘petasos-wearing’ (Greeks)⁹⁷ and (Scythians) ‘with pointed hats’.⁹⁸ Evidently, when the Persians were faced with groups of people perhaps only imperfectly known in detail and in any case possessing no single, simply identified and well-defined state, they resorted to both geographical and cultural indicators to help to reduce an amorphous mass to manageable proportions. But the fact that cultural indicators might be used does not diminish the importance that geographical divisions, especially those represented by sea-coasts, may have had in the Persian picture of the world. One may compare here the formulae quoted below (n. 110) describing Darius’ empire, as well as certain features of Assyrian and Babylonian documents.⁹⁹

When the Persians first reached Asia Minor and started formulating concepts to describe it, they were not a sea-power. Mazares can demand the return of Pactyes from Cyme, but must bargain with Chios and Mytilene,¹⁰⁰ and the original Persian conquest of the mainland left the islanders unafraid.¹⁰¹ During the Ionian Revolt the Persians can recapture the Asiatic Hellenistic cities almost immediately, but those on the European side have to wait for the neutralization of Greek sea-power.¹⁰² In the fifth and fourth centuries it was always a matter of lengthy preparations to get a war-fleet into the Aegean capable of realizing any Persian control beyond the

⁹⁴ D H; D Ph; J. Yoyotte, *J. Asiat.* cclx (1972) 253 f. The tablets (pre-Scythian Expedition) show Sparda (=Sardis) as the NW limit of the empire. Since the acquisition of the Greek cities had been simply a clearing-up operation after the conquest of their previous overlord (viz. Lydia) this need not be surprising; the Greeks might be subsumed under the title of the capital of their erstwhile rulers, from which they were still governed: cf. Lewis (n. 34) 118 f. The hieroglyphic inscription is rather more remarkable, since it is argued that it belongs towards the end of Darius’ reign (cf. F. Vallat, *J. Asiat.* cclx (1972) 251; J. Yoyotte, *ibid.* 265 f.). It might be contemporary with the Ionian Revolt; but would the composers of official documents have been scrupulous enough to allow that to affect the matter? It is perhaps germane to note that the Persians perceived similarities between Ionians and Lydians in some external customs, e.g. hair-styles: cf. R. D. Barnett, *Iraq* xix (1957) 68–9; Walser (n. 93) 54, 56; W. Hinz, *Altiranische Funde und Forschungen* (Berlin 1969) 98. Perhaps one could think of Ionians and Lydians as all of a piece; Hdt. (i 94) could write *Ἀυδοὶ δὲ νόμοισι μὲν παραπλησίοισι χρέωνται καὶ Ἕλληνας χωρὶς ἢ ὅτι τὰ θήλα τέκνα καταπορνεύουσι* and cf. Xenophon. 3 W (on Colophon) and Hippias *FGrH* 421 F 1 (on Erythrae). For a similar looseness, compare the Babylonians in D Sf 53 (really Greeks resident in Babylon, acc. Kent [n. 85] 143). An example of the reverse phenomenon at a much earlier date is afforded by Esarhaddon’s description of people with distinctly non-Greek names as ‘Ionian’: E.

Weidner, *Mélanges . . . R. Dussaud* ii (Paris 1939) 932; A. Goetze, *J. Cun. Stud.* xvi (1962) 54.

⁹⁵ Junge (n. 93) 12; M. Ehtéham, *L’Iran sous les Achéménides* (Fribourg 1946) 141–2; Walser (n. 93) 29. An unlikely hypothesis, however: Kent (n. 91).

⁹⁶ D Na 28–9; A? P 24.

⁹⁷ Cf. n. 90.

⁹⁸ D BV 22; D Na 25; D N XV; X Ph 26–7; A? P 15.

⁹⁹ For the (conquered) world bounded by the Upper and Lower Seas, cf. A. H. Sayce, *Essays in Aegean Archaeology presented to Sir Arthur Evans*, ed. S. Casson (Oxford 1927) 107; A. L. Oppenheim *ap.* J. B. Pritchard, *Ancient Near Eastern Texts* (Princeton 1969) 267b, 269a, 276b–277a, 297b *bis*, 307a. The Upper Sea is referred to by itself in *ibid.* 269a, 283b. For the world bounded by the Seas of the Amurru-country and the Nairi-country, cf. *ibid.* 275b, 277a, the latter of which also mentions the Sea of the Zamua-country. The Sea of the Amurru-country (approx.=Phoenicia)=the Upper Sea (cf. *ibid.* 278a). Adad-Nirari III (*ibid.* 281b) speaks of the Great Seas of the Setting and Rising Sun. In many of these cases the monarch also claims to rule everything ‘within the four rims of the earth’, so it is legitimate to regard the seas as being held to bound the known world.

¹⁰⁰ Hdt. i 157 ff.

¹⁰¹ Hdt. i 143. Contrast however i 169.2 (after the suppression of Paktyes).

¹⁰² Hdt. v 116 f., 122 f.; vi 33.

sea-coast. Indeed the King's Peace and the negotiations that preceded it were to some extent diplomatic recognitions of this fact. For a brief period after Megabazus' expedition Persia had some sort of foot-hold in Europe,¹⁰³ but for most of the era of confrontation between the Greek world and the Achaemenids, Persia's writ, as opposed to her ambitions,¹⁰⁴ ran as far as the Aegean and Sea of Marmara coast and no further, and the political centres of gravity (i.e. Sardis, Dascylium) were not even on those coasts. Consequently the considerations noted above, p. 147 (ii), (iv), as militating against Greek thoughts of the 'Greeks of Asia' did not much affect Persians. Significantly Herodotus' one reference to the 'Greeks in Asia' is in a context involving the contrast of mainland and islands from the viewpoint of a non-maritime oriental power, Croesus' Lydia.¹⁰⁵

(c) As the Persians became increasingly preoccupied with the 'frontier problem' presented by the Greek world (especially after the formal cession of Asia to the King by the Spartans) they were likely to develop the idea not entertained by Greeks—*cf.* above, p. 148 (v)—that the Greeks in Asia were, so to speak, misplaced in the scheme of things; that is, that Greeks as such belonged in Europe not Asia. This is certainly akin to the view that Herodotus already attributes to the Persians: *τὴν γὰρ Ἀσίην καὶ τὰ ἐνοικέοντα ἔθνεα βάρβαρα οἰκηεῦνται οἱ Πέρσαι, τὴν δὲ Εὐρώπην καὶ τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἤγηται κεχωρίσθαι* (i 4), *τὴν Ἀσίην νομίζουσι ἐωντῶν εἶναι Πέρσαι καὶ τοῦ αἰεὶ βασιλεύοντος* (ix 116).¹⁰⁶

(d) Of course, the Persians, like other orientals, lacked the concept of 'Asia'.¹⁰⁷ Whereas Aeschylus could speak of one man ruling all *Ἀσίς μηλοτρόφος*, Herodotus could use *Ἀσία* to mean the Persian Empire,¹⁰⁸ and the translator of Darius' letter to Gadatas could write *τὰ κάτω τῆς Ἀσίας*,¹⁰⁹ the Persians themselves had to be content with exhaustive circumlocutions.¹¹⁰ The precise formulation 'Greeks of Asia' had, therefore, to be made by a Greek.

Since the Greeks who lived in Asia had little intrinsic reason for doing this, one turns to those outside Asia. Generally speaking, the situation there was no more favourable. Many of the points already made applied also to the European Greeks. They too were prone to think in ethnic terms and with the perspective of a maritime people. Athens would regard her 'colonies' as a special class; so too, *mutatis mutandis*, Dorian Sparta. Almost all would see the Hellespont as a unit. But were there no special circumstances that might have produced the concept nonetheless—in particular the circumstances of the Athenian Empire?

In fact it seems not. The official Athenian divisions of the Aegean world did nothing to help. In the tribute-lists from 443/2 onwards Asia is divided into three panels, Hellespont, Ionia and Caria, reflecting exactly the natural Greek view of the area; the Hellespont is a unit, the Dorians

¹⁰³ Contrasting views on its extent in H. Castritius, *Chiron* ii (1972) 1 ff. and N. G. L. Hammond—G. T. Griffith, *History of Macedonia* ii (Oxford 1979) 58 f.

¹⁰⁴ *Cf.* Thuc. viii 18, 37, treaties recognising the King's right to all ancestrally held land (*cf.* also Thuc. viii 43). Lewis, (n. 34) 90, believes that 'it is unlikely that either party had more than Asia Minor in mind'. The Spartans may have been that insouciant, but I doubt that Tissaphernes was. This is not to say that he actually expected to get ancestral holdings outside Asia in the immediate future or cared greatly when a more restricted formulation was devised in 411 (Thuc. viii 58). Notice though that on Lewis' reading (101 f.) Tissaphernes was quite happy to acquiesce in Alcibiades' demand that Athens give up off-shore islands (Thuc. viii 56.4).

¹⁰⁵ Hdt. i 27.

¹⁰⁶ *Cf.* Lewis (n. 34) 99 n. 69, 155 n. 125. These passages can surely stand as fifth-century estimates of the Persian view of things.

¹⁰⁷ B. Hemerdinger's unlikely idea that *Ἀσία* derives from Akk. *ša sīt*, as in *mā ša sīt šamsī* = land of the rising sun (*Helikon* vii [1967] 239) does not affect the issue since the Akk. phrase is not equivalent in use to *Ἀσία*. The same goes for Egyptian *setjet*, translated as 'Asia' in J. A. Wilson *ap.* J. B. Pritchard (n. 99) 227, and for a rather better

candidate as source of *Ἀσία*, *viz* Hitt. *Assuwa*: *cf.* S. P. B. Durnford, *Rev. Hitt.* xxxiii (1975) 53.

¹⁰⁸ *Pers.* 763–4; Hdt. i 95, 107, 130, 192, 209; iii 67, 88, 137, 138; iv 1, 44; v 49, 97; vi 24, 70, 116, 118, 119. *Cf.* Thuc. i 109, ii 67 etc.

¹⁰⁹ ML no. 12. *τοὺς πέραν τοῦ Εὐφράτου καρπούς* (in the same text) is also not identical with oriental usage: *cf.* M. van den Hout, *Mnem.* 4 ii (1949) 150.

¹¹⁰ E.g. Darius ruled over 'many lands, Persia, Media, other lands, other tongues, (where are) mountains and plains, on this the nearer shore of the Bitter Sea and on that the farther shore of the Bitter Sea, (as well as) on this the near side of the region of thirst (the desert) and on that the farther side of the region of thirst': D Pg in F. H. Weissbach, *Die Keilinschriften der Achämeniden* (Leipzig 1911) 85–7; trans. Cameron (n. 85) 54. The King is 'King of peoples with many kinds of men, King in this great earth far and wide' (D E 14–19; X Pa 7–9; X Pb 14–19; X Pd 10–13; X Pf 10–13; X Ph 8–11; X E 16–18; X V 11–14; A 1 Pa 11–14; Lewis (n. 34) 78 n. 132. *Cf.* also D Na 9f and the shorter version of the formula found in X Pj 1–2 and many other documents. Is Hdt. ix 122.2 *δτε γε ἀνθρώπων τε πολλῶν ἄρχομεν πάσης τε τῆς Ἀσίας* perhaps a reflection of this type of formula?

(mainland and off-shore) are part of Caria and thus separated from Ionia, into which Cyme and Aeolis is subsumed and which would no doubt also have included Samos and Chios had they been tribute-paying.¹¹¹ In the Congress Decree¹¹² separate groups of ambassadors go to the Ionians, Dorians in Asia and islanders (panels I, IV, V) and to Hellespont and Thrace (panels II, III). The same division is found in Thuc. ii 9.4 and viii 96.4, and strategically the Hellespont is always regarded as separate from Ionia.¹¹³

But, if the attempted liberation of the Greeks of Asia in the early fourth century played a vital role in creating a unitary notion of those Greeks, why did that not already apply in the aftermath of Xerxes' defeat and the beginnings of the Athenian Empire?

The crucial point seems to be the extent to which liberating the Greeks of Asia was regarded as a separate issue from liberating the Greeks of Europe. In the 390s Sparta claimed to have liberated the Greeks of Europe and the Aegean from Athenian imperialism. She had done so at the expense of an alliance with Persia which recognized 'the land of the King in Asia' as belonging to the King,¹¹⁴ a formulation in effect drawing a line between the Greeks in Asia and those elsewhere and depriving the former of their freedom, the first time that such a state of affairs had been explicitly and formally recognised.¹¹⁵ Some time later, and as a separate enterprise, the Spartans set about the re-liberation of those whom they had previously surrendered. They were now to achieve for the Greeks within what had been admitted to be the King's *chora* the same liberty they had already (allegedly) achieved for those who were not. The point duly appears in Xenophon: the cities in Asia shall be autonomous ὡσπερ καὶ τὰς ἐν τῇ παρ' ἡμῶν Ἑλλάδι.¹¹⁶

Looked at in these terms the situation earlier was not comparable. Consider first 479, at first sight a favourable context. The Hellenic League needed considerable persuasion by the Ionians to involve itself in Asia Minor, despite the strategic attractions of such a move.¹¹⁷ To some extent, therefore, the Asian venture might have been seen as a separate one. Even after Mycale, there were those who thought it impracticable to protect Ionia indefinitely; hence the proposed population transfers, to bring the rebel Ionians back to Europe, an area the Greeks felt was theirs and could be defended.¹¹⁸ Such people also regarded the destruction of the Hellespont bridges as taking the pressure off and leaving the problems posed by the Persians still in Europe to be dealt with at leisure.¹¹⁹ There may seem implicit here a view that there was a sharp divide between Asia and Europe, and that one must belong to the Persians while the other did not. Once that distinction had been made, might not Leotychidas' more adventurous colleagues have spoken of the desirability of liberating not only the Greeks of Europe but also those of Asia?

Against this a number of points may be made. (1) The fact that the Greeks were apprehensive about venturing to Asia does not mean that they did not appreciate the strategic point of doing so or that once they had acted they would not see the campaign as part of the 'war with the Persians'. Certainly there is no evidence that the Athenians saw it any other way—and for the moment it was to be the Athenian view that prevailed in practice and propaganda. (2) The outcome of the debate at Samos did of course implicitly guarantee that the League would in due course look to the safety of the Ionians and others. Whether there was any commitment to the active liberation of non-rebellious Greeks is another and darker matter. The Athenian view was that they did not wish to see Ionia ἀνάστατος and that it was not the Peloponnesians' business to dictate about Athenian colonies; not that it was the duty of the European Greeks to extend liberation to all Greeks threatened by Persia. At most they were arrogating the right to oversee the protection of Ionia. That is not the same as the 'liberation of the Greeks of Asia'. (3) The request for help had come specifically from Ionians and one may take it that they spoke in terms of 'Ionia'. Moreover

¹¹¹ Judging from the presence of Leros and the Icarian cities (Thermae and Oine) in the Ionian panel.—From 438 Caria and Ionia were amalgamated. For 'Ionia' cf. also e.g. *Hesp.* xxxii (1963) 39, ἀρχοντας τ[ὸς ἐκ τῶν πολέων τῶν ἐν] Ἰονίαι.

¹¹² Plut. *Per.* 17. Its authenticity is of course disputed. The thesis of the present study would indicate another anachronism, viz: πάντας Ἑλλήνας τοὺς ὁποῖοτε κατοικοῦντας Εὐρώπης ἢ τῆς Ἀσίας παρακαλεῖν.

¹¹³ A reflection of that is found in the form of partial *atimia* which forbade a man to sail to Hellespont or Ionia

(Andoc. i 76).

¹¹⁴ Thuc. viii 58.

¹¹⁵ Lewis' new reading of the situation between 412/11 and 400/399, (n. 34) chs 5 and 6, would qualify this statement in certain respects, but not enough, I think, substantially to affect the point at issue here.

¹¹⁶ *Hell.* iii 4.5.

¹¹⁷ Hdt. viii 132; ix 90.

¹¹⁸ Hdt. ix 106; Diod. xi 57.

¹¹⁹ Hence no prosecution of the siege of Sestus in winter 479/8; Hdt. ix 114; Thuc. i 89.

the preponderance of military power lay with the Ionian and Aeolian *islanders*, not with the Greeks of Asia proper. The slogan of the moment should therefore have been the 'Liberation/Protection of Ionia', not the 'Liberation of the Greeks of Asia'. (4) Although the Samos debate raised the issue of what could be genuinely and permanently liberated, the consequence of the Spartan defeat in that debate was not the active liberation of anywhere in Asia. For one thing, some places had already seized liberty by rebellion. For another, all agreed that the area of immediate strategic importance was the Dardanelles and Sea of Marmara.

Things did not change much in 478. The Cyprus expedition can be seen in terms of prevention of a resurgence of Persian naval power and maintenance of the *status quo* in the Aegean,¹²⁰ and the siege of Byzantium continued the strategic preoccupations of 479. Ionia and the rest of Asiatic Greece were rather forgotten. Eventually, and encouraged by distaste for Pausanias, Ionia objected and called on Athens to realize her commitment to the protection of Ionia. The result was the Delian League. Notoriously the accounts of the formation of that league do not say that its purpose was the liberation of the Greeks of Asia (however described). Rather they recognise that it represented little more than a change of leadership in the war with Persia, the same war that was being waged by the Hellenic League.¹²¹ The new League had no reason to excogitate a propaganda line not adopted by the Hellenic League. The Ionians had secured what they wanted by obtaining a *hegemon* who was not uninterested in their cities, who would swear oaths of eternal friendship¹²² and who would organize a military structure capable of backing up that commitment. The strategic situation could still be argued to dictate concentration on the Hellespont and, later, Thrace. Subsequently, people would look back and claim explicitly what is never stated in the sources directly concerned with the league's foundation, that liberation was the purpose of the enterprise. But notice what exactly is said: *ξύμμαχοι μέντοι ἐγενόμεθα οὐκ ἐπὶ καταδουλώσει τῶν Ἑλλήνων Ἀθηναίους, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐλευθερώσει ἀπὸ τοῦ Μήδου τοῖς Ἑλλησιν.*¹²³ Athenian enslavement was held to apply to Greeks in all manner of places. Logically the same should go for their liberation. It would have been unnecessarily weak to speak only of the liberation of one particular set of Greeks, when the war whose leadership Athens had acquired was concerned with finishing off an invasion that had threatened the whole Greek world and with preventing the repetition of such an invasion.¹²⁴ The Eurymedon campaign and the offensive in Cyprus and Egypt were undertaken for the safety of the Aegean world as a whole.¹²⁵ Political changes in individual cities that betokened Persian interference could be seen either in that Aegean-wide context or as local affairs of e.g. Miletus or Erythrae. In between the 'Greeks of Asia' got lost—or rather were never discovered.¹²⁶

Similar considerations apply to the Peace of Callias.¹²⁷ Since fourth-century writers tend to view it in terms of the King's Peace it is natural, but I think misguided, to wonder whether the 'Greeks of Asia' might not have appeared in its terms. Quite apart from the fact that the definition of the western limits of Persian intervention in purely geographical terms meant that the 'closed' area would include non-Greek inhabitants,¹²⁸ the purpose of the Peace was surely to secure more

¹²⁰ Cf. Meiggs (n. 70) 38–9, though he does not put the matter quite thus.

¹²¹ Hdt. viii 3; Thuc. i 75, 96; Xen. *Vect.* v 5; Isoc. xii 52; Aristod. *FGrH* 104 F 1 § 7; Diod. xi 46–7; Nep. *Arist.* 2.2–3; Plut. *Aristid.* 23–5, *Cim.* 6. The fact that the Delian League was a supplement to rather than a total replacement of the Hellenic League (which continued in existence, Thuc. i 102.4) does not affect the point.

¹²² The form of the oath (sinking of *μύδροι*) may be characteristically Ionian—Hdt. i 165.3, Jeffery (n. 70) 228—a reflection of the predominantly Ionian make-up of the original Delian League.

¹²³ Thuc. iii 10.

¹²⁴ Pl. *Menex.* 241d.

¹²⁵ Pl. *Menex.* 242a, one of the few ancient passages which recognizes that Eurymedon was in a sense the final battle of the 'Persian Wars'; cf. also Plut. *Cim.* 12.

¹²⁶ Accordingly the Athenians never developed the

doctrinaire attitude that would have required the elimination of persophile local dynasts such as the Gongylids and Demaratids: cf. G. E. M. de Ste Croix, *Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (London 1972) 38 f. Liberation of the Greeks of Asia interpreted pedantically should have entailed their removal. J. M. Cook's views on land-holding in Asia Minor, *PCPS* vii (1961) 9 f., would also be pertinent here, if one could feel sure they were correct.

¹²⁷ I assume *argumenti causa* that this existed. Even if it did not—and cf. now the very full argument of that case in C. Schrader, *La Paz de Calias: testimonios e interpretación* (Barcelona 1976)—some of the comments here can be applied *mutatis mutandis* to the *de facto* attitudes of the Athenians.

¹²⁸ This accorded with the strategic need to keep the Persians away from the Aegean coast, not just from Greek cities. For the land-limits cf. the tabulation in Meiggs (n. 70) 487–8.

than an arrangement about Asia. Isocrates wrote that the Athenians made the peace *τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν βασιλέως ὀρίζοντες*.¹²⁹ The emphasis was on saying that the King shall rule so far and no further, not on saying that he may rule Asia, except for the Greek cities within it.¹³⁰ Lysias, writing before the King's Peace and referring perhaps to the Peace of Callias, perhaps merely to the situation that some regarded as consequent upon that Peace, says that Athenian hegemony meant that *οὔτε τριήρεις ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χρόνῳ ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας ἔπλευσαν οὔτε τύραννος ἐν τοῖς Ἑλλησι κατέστη, οὔτε Ἑλληνὶς πόλις ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων ἠνδραποδίσθη*.¹³¹ It is the protection of all Greece from a repetition of 480/79 that is in question.¹³² This general scope fitted the propaganda of the Delian League and was prudent when facing an Empire that might aspire, however unreasonably, to claim ownership of lands as far away as Macedonia on the grounds of former suzerainty.¹³³

The circumstances of the Athenian Empire in the making therefore offered no incentive for the discovery of the 'Greeks of Asia'. Nor did those of the Empire at its height¹³⁴ and in most of the long war that was to destroy it.¹³⁵

The conditions of the creation of the Spartan Empire that replaced it were more favourable. The crucial period was that of the Spartan/Persian contacts at the start of the Ionian War. Persian aims at the time amounted to the determination of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus to recover *τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχῆς φόρους οὓς δι' Ἀθηναίους ἀπὸ τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πολέων οὐ δυνάμενος πράσσεισθαι ἐπωφείλησεν*.¹³⁶ Taking the *archai* of the two satraps together and assuming that strictly they did not extend beyond the sea-coast, this comes close to a policy of recovering the tribute of 'the Greeks of Asia', and it was in accordance with that policy that Alcibiades sought the assistance of Tissaphernes by claiming that the Athenians would be prepared *ξυγκαταδουλοῦν σφίσι τε αὐτοῖς τὸ τῆς θαλάσσης μέρος καὶ ἐκείνῳ ὅσοι ἐν τῇ βασιλέως Ἑλληνες οἰκοῦσι*.¹³⁷ Given the equivalence of *ἡ βασιλέως* and *Ἀσία* this is tantamount to the surrender of the 'Greeks of Asia',¹³⁸ and the formulation exhibits neatly that sharp distinction of sea and mainland which was necessary for the emergence of the 'Greeks of Asia'. In the event, Alcibiades' claims came to nothing as far as Athens was concerned. The Spartans, however, were prepared to do what Alcibiades had promised of the Athenians. On the common view, the first two Sparta–Persia treaties formally allowed Darius' claim to all ancestrally held land. When that was decided to be excessive, the Spartans, lacking the seafarer's perspective which denied a sharp division between Asia and the islands or between the Asiatic and European sides of the Dardanelles and Sea of Marmara, were quite ready to fall in with the Persian viewpoint (*cf.* above p. 149) that the sea-coast was the next natural boundary. On Lewis' view¹³⁹ this mutual agreement on the coast as boundary had already been reached (or assumed) from the first treaty onwards. The phrase 'the Greeks of Asia' has still not emerged into the full light of cliché; in fact the third treaty (the first explicitly to draw the boundary at the edge of mainland Asia) suppresses all mention of *poleis* let

¹²⁹ iv 120.

¹³⁰ Lycurgus (*in Leoc.* 73) said that the Athenians imposed boundaries on the barbarians *εἰς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν τῆς Ἑλλάδος* (i.e. all Greece) and dictated that *τοὺς Ἑλληνας αὐτονόμους εἶναι*. The fact that he adds *μὴ μόνον τοὺς τὴν Εὐρώπην ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς τὴν Ἀσίαν κατοικοῦντας* merely reflects fourth-century contrast with the King's Peace; it does not prove that the distinction of European and Asiatic Greeks was in the Peace terms. The same goes for Suda s.v. 'Kimón'. *Ἀυτονόμους τε εἶναι τοὺς Ἑλληνας καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ* could be taken as an indication that the peace talked about *all* Greeks.

¹³¹ ii 57.

¹³² If Wade-Gery's conjecture about *ἔσπε ἐπὶ Αἰγυπτῶν καὶ Λιβύῃν τῶν πόλεε* (Craterus *FGrH* 342 F 18) were right (*Essays in Greek History* [Oxford 1958] 232) that would be another indication that the scope was wider than just Asia Minor.

¹³³ *Cf.* n. 104.

¹³⁴ E.g. the Panhellenism of Pericles, if it existed (*cf.* S. Perlman, *Historia* xxv [1976] 6–17), unlike fourth-century Panhellenism was not about the 'Greeks of Asia'. The

Ionian colonization propaganda of the Athenian Empire (*cf.* J. Barron, *JHS* lxxxiv [1964] 46 f.; Meiggs [n. 70] 43, 119–20, 298 f.), the separate existence for fiscal purposes of probable former dependencies of Dodecapolis cities (*cf.* tables in Meiggs [n. 70] 540 f.), the possible disappearance of the Panionian league (but the evidence on that—Hdt. i 148.1; Thuc. iii 104, *cf.* Dion. Hal. *AR* iv 25; Diod. xv 49; Timoth. *Pers.* 246 f.—is a model of imponderability) are factors whose effect on the general situation is hard to judge.

¹³⁵ Until 412. The activities of Pissothnes were not of a scope radically to alter the *status quo*, and until 412 the Dascylium satraps caused no serious trouble to Athens: Lewis (n. 34) 59 f. Nothing we know of the Peace of Epilycus appears likely to have affected the matter either.

¹³⁶ Thuc. viii 5.5, 6.1.

¹³⁷ Thuc. viii 46.3.

¹³⁸ That Thuc. does not actually use the phrase is perhaps an indication that it did not achieve cliché status during his lifetime. Note that at 56.4 he returns to talking about *Ἰωνίαν . . . πάσαν*.

¹³⁹ *Op. cit.* (n. 60) 90. *Cf.* n. 104.

alone *poleis Hellenides*. But the basis has been laid¹⁴⁰ and thanks to the coming together of Spartan and Persian perspectives, both of them unlike those of the majority of Greeks in that they could recognize a 'land-frontier denying cultural and geographical facts which go across it'¹⁴¹ the slogan 'Greeks of Asia' is within an ace of starting its long, if at times squalid, history.¹⁴²

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APPENDIX

It is instructive to consider briefly the superficially similar case of the Greeks of Sicily and Italy. The following points deserve notice. (i) Phrases such as *οἱ κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν Ἕλληνες* are of less frequent occurrence because of the existence of the words *Σικελιώται* and *Ἰταλιώται*. That no such term was ever coined to describe the Greeks of Asia is in itself highly suggestive. (ii) The Greeks of Sicily and Italy appear more aware of themselves as corporate units than the Greeks of Asia. The outsider's awareness of the Siceliots as a group cut off from Greece proper by the Ionian or Sicilian seas¹⁴³ is reinforced and amplified by Hermocrates' reasons why the Greeks of Sicily should think of themselves as a unit despite their racial differences: they are neighbours, they inhabit a single island territory, and they share a common name.¹⁴⁴ It is striking that none of these factors applies to the Greeks of Asia.¹⁴⁵ (iii) The Greeks of Italy and Sicily may be contrasted with native barbarians or Carthaginians, but also with the Greeks of mainland Greece.¹⁴⁶ (iv) The Greeks of Italy in particular are capable of positive joint action as a body. At the time of the Athenian expedition Rhegium declares that it will do whatever seems good to the Italiots as a whole.¹⁴⁷ In 393 the Italian Greeks form an active alliance against Dionysius and the Lucanians.¹⁴⁸ (v) 'The freedom of the Greeks of Sicily' appears more than once as a slogan; it is exploited by Dionysius, by Dion, and by Timoleon.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁰ A referee makes the suggestion that the Treaty of Boeotus, Lewis (n. 34) 122 ff., might have used the phrase. This is not implausible (and n. 138 would not stand against it) but, of course, unverifiable on present evidence.

¹⁴¹ Lewis (n. 34) 155.

¹⁴² The author of this section wishes to express his thanks to Robin Seager for the invitation to contribute it (and for subsequent discussion) and to Alan Millard (School of Oriental Studies, Univ. of Liverpool) for valuable assistance with the Near Eastern material.

¹⁴³ Thuc. vi 13.1.

¹⁴⁴ Thuc. iv 64.3.

¹⁴⁵ The imprecise use of 'Ionians' to include some or all of the other Greeks of Asia in addition to the Ionians proper does not invalidate this point: it merely underlines it.

¹⁴⁶ Cf. Thuc. vii 58.3; Diod. xi 1.4, 23.2, xiv 47.5, xvi 73.2.

¹⁴⁷ Thuc. vi 44.3; Diod. xiii 3.5.

¹⁴⁸ Diod. xiv 91.3, 100.1, 101.1, 103.4, 104.4.

¹⁴⁹ Dionysius: Diod. xiv 46.5, 47.2, xv 15.4; Dion: Diod. xvi 10.3; Timoleon: Diod. xvi 65.9, 82.3, 90.1.